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ROGER J. TRAYNOR PROFESSORSHIP

ACCEPTANCE BY JOHN

E. NOYES*

I sincerely thank California Western School of Law and the
Traynor family for the honor of being named the inaugural Roger J.
Traynor Professor of Law.
My favorite topic is "international law and

. .

."-fill in the blank.

I have a few comments about international law and Justice Traynor.
Now I suspect that when most of us hear the name "Roger Traynor,"
international law is not the first thing that comes to mind. We think
about Justice Traynor's groundbreaking constitutional and common
law opinions. We think about Escola1 and Greenman,2 for example,
which introduced strict products liability in torts, and about Perez v.
Sharp,3 which struck down California's anti-miscegenation statute on
equal protection grounds long before the U.S. Supreme Court reached
a similar result. 4 We think about Justice Traynor's pragmatism and his
links to legal realism. 5 We study his careful style of judicial reasoning
6
and analyze why and when he was willing to depart from precedent.
But we usually don't think first about international law when we think
about Roger Traynor. And, I must say, with some reason.
*

Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, California Western School of Law.

Thanks to Cavan Cox, who provided valuable research assistance for this essay.
1. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
2. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
3. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
4. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
5. See BEN FIELD, ACTIVISM IN PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER J. TRAYNOR 6-16 (2003).
6. See G. EDWARD WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITIONS 243-66 (3d ed.

2007). For Justice Traynor's analysis of judicial decision-making, see, for example,
Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make
Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (1962).
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The Supreme Court of California, during Roger Traynor's tenure
from 1940 to 1970, applied substantive rules of international law in
only a few cases. The clearest examples were cases that involved
treaties regulating the taxation of foreign entities, extradition, and
inheritance. 7 As the court recognized, the U.S. Constitution establishes
U.S. treaties as part of the supreme law of the land.8 The court also9
analyzed a few statutes that incorporated treaty rules by reference.
And, although the days when U.S. courts had regularly invoked the
law merchant and other aspects of the law of nations were long gone
by 1940, the Supreme Court of California still occasionally invoked
non-treaty international law principles.' 0
Justice Traynor himself can't be called a leader when it comes to
applying treaties or customary international law rules in the U.S. legal
system. Although Justice Traynor joined some of the opinions in
which the Supreme Court of California relied on treaties as rules of
decision," he wrote none of them, and he did not focus on applying
7. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 363 P.2d 25, 4144 (Cal.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961) (applying 1939 U.S.-Sweden
convention and protocol concerning double taxation); Coumas v. Superior Court,
192 P.2d 449 (Cal. 1948) (applying 1931 U.S.-Greece extradition treaty); In re
Estate of Knutzen, 191 P.2d 747, 750 (Cal. 1948) (applying 1923 U.S.-Germany
treaty on inheritance rights).
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The court recognized this principle in several
cases in which it did not use a treaty rule, see, e.g., Kramer v. Superior Court, 222
P.2d 874 (Cal. 1950) (refusing to rely on treaty when timely appeal not filed), as
well as in cases in which the court applied treaties.
9. See, e.g., Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 195 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
10. See, e.g., In re Estate of Larkin, 416 P.2d 473, 478-79 & n.7 (Cal. 1966)
(noting international law principle of national treatment of aliens); In re Estate of
Arbulich, 157 P.2d 433, 450-52 (Cal.) (Carter, J., concurring), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
897 (1953) (discussing rights of consular officials under international law);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 185 P.2d 805 (Cal. 1947), rev'd on other
grounds, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (recognizing concepts of territorial sea and high seas);
Allen v. California Water & Tel. Co., 176 P.2d 8, 15 (Cal. 1946) (recognizing international boundary with Mexico and Mexico's freedom of action within its territory,
absent treaty limitations).
11. In the cases cited in footnote 7, Justice Traynor joined the court's opinion
in Coumas and Knutzen. He dissented in ScandinavianAirlines System. Although
Justice Traynor recognized that U.S. treaties could provide a binding rule of
decision, he, unlike the majority, interpreted the treaty at issue in that case to permit
the County of Los Angeles to impose property taxes on foreign airlines.
ScandinavianAirlines System, 363 P.2d at 46-47 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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treaties in his scholarship. He also sometimes found reasons not to
apply international law rules that other justices invoked. Why? If we
look at cases in which Justice Traynor rejected international law
arguments, we get a few insights into his approach to judging.
Consider People v. Sidener, a 1962 case in which Traynor wrote
the majority opinion.' 2 The court upheld the constitutionality of a
California statute providing that a recidivism charge, which would
increase a defendant's criminal penalties, could only be dismissed
when the district attorney moved to dismiss it. According to the
dissent, the statute impermissibly infringed on judicial authority; the
courts should be able to dismiss such charges on their own. To support
its position, the dissent argued-here's the international law bit that
Justice Traynor did not accept-that when Mexican territory was
transferred to California in the 1840s, "established" international
principles provided that preexisting Mexican civil law affecting
individuals remained in force. 13 This Mexican law gave the courts,
rather than the executive branch, the discretion to drop certain
criminal charges. Traynor disagreed with the dissent's historical and
international law-based argument,14 but, more fundamentally, he
found it irrelevant. "The meaning of constitutional provisions... is
not static," he wrote, "and the scope of judicial power" with respect to
criminal charges "is not found in history alone." 15 Defining criminal
offenses and punishments were "legislative matters."' 6 In shortvintage Traynor-the law must respond to changing times and social
needs, and the values of California society in the early 1960s left it to
the legislature to determine criminal penalties. An old international
weight to nineteenth-century Mexican
law rule that would have given
7
law really wasn't relevant.'
12. People v. Sidener, 375 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1962), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 374 U.S. 494 (1963).
13. Id. at 650 (Schauer, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the international law
principle that a change in sovereignty may leave intact the predecessor sovereign's
domestic law affecting individuals, see, for example, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 623-28 (6th ed. 2003).
14. Justice Traynor thought that the statute restored part of a prosecutorial
common law power of nolle prosequi. Sidener, 375 P.2d at 643.
15. Id. at 644.
16. Id.
17. Echoing Justice Traynor's view that the law must respond to current social
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Well, what about newer international law? Some California litigants invoked treaty provisions in challenging racially discriminatory
state statutes. In Perez v. Sharp, the 1948 case about the legality of
mixed marriages, Justice Carter, in his concurring opinion, cited the
U.N Charter to support his view that racially discriminatory laws
violated "fundamental" legal precepts.' 8 But Justice Traynor, writing
for the majority, did not cite the Charter. He relied instead on the
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause and quoted social science
literature to establish that California's statutory racial classifications
were irrational. Justice Traynor also concurred in another 1948 case
involving a challenge to a California statute that prohibited aliens
from owning land; he found an equal Frotection violation, while the
majority used a treaty-based argument.
The California Supreme Court considered the legal effect of the
U.N. Charter in the court's most infamous international law case, Sei
Fujii v. California,20 decided in 1952. In Sei Fujii the court squarely
addressed whether the anti-discrimination articles of the Charter, 2 1 a
U.S. treaty, should apply under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution to invalidate California's alien land law. The court, in an
opinion that Justice Traynor joined, concluded that those Charter
articles were not self-executing and thus could not be judicially
applied absent implementing federal legislation.2 2 The court instead

needs, the dissent recognized that its own historical argument was not dispositive:
(W]hat is an essential part of the judicial process . . . is neither
static in quality nor fixed in time. . . . The real issue . . . is not

whether the hearing and determination of the question of
dismissing a charge of prior conviction was an essential part of the
judicial process in 1849 or 1872 or 1879; rather, the issue is
whether such hearing and determination is today an essential part
of that process.
1d. at 652 (Schauer, J., dissenting).

18. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring).
19. Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 195 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
20. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). The case is still excerpted in
U.S. international law textbooks. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 186-89 (3d ed. 2006).

21. U.N. Charter arts. 55-56.
22. Several commentators argued at the time that state courts should directly
apply the U.N. Charter and other treaties in cases affecting individuals. See, e.g.,
Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 AM. J.
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relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate the discriminatory
statute. Professor Lockwood has argued that the U.N. Charter
"help[ed] American courts find the United States Constitution," by
promoting revised understandings of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.23 Some convincing evidence supports that assertion.
But for Justice Traynor, the sources and reasoning that a rational judge
would use to overturn a discriminatory law should be familiar to the
local bench and bar. The reasoning must persuade the local society.
The new U.N. Charter, though "a moral commitment of foremost
importance, ' ' 24 was just too unusual and controversial to use as a U.S.
legal source, especially when the Fourteenth Amendment could be
called into service.25
Although Justice Traynor is not renowned for using treaties or
other substantive rules of international law, he is justly famous for his
work in one area that we could characterize as a type of international
law. That's the field of conflict of laws, which international lawyers
call private international law. Now, we could have an interesting
discussion about the senses in which private international law, and
especially the part governing choice of law, is truly international.
What is the law that determines which among multiple competing
laws should govern in multijurisdictional disputes or transactions? It's
a myth that choice-of-law principles are necessarily part of state or
INT'L L. 62 (1951). For an excellent discussion of the self-executing treaty doctrine
and the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, see Carlos M. Vdzquez, Foster v. Neilson
and United States v. Percheman: Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 151 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis

eds., 2007). For the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on self-executing
treaties, see Medellin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008).
23. Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charterand United States Civil
Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REv. 901, 902 (1984).
24. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 622. The Sei Fujii court did not, however, rule that
every article of the U.N. Charter was not self-executing, suggesting that the
Charter's privileges and immunities articles would have direct effect in U.S. courts
without implementing legislation. Id. at 621.
25. The Supreme Court of California addressed the U.N. Charter argument,
which was not essential to the court's holding, because a lower court had relied on
the Charter in striking down the discriminatory California statute at issue. Sei Fujii
v. State, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950). According to Professor Lockwood, the explanation for the supreme court's refusal to rely on the U.N. Charter
"rests less with a view of judicial restraint, than with a recognition of the strong antiUnited Nations feelings prevailing at the time." Lockwood, supra note 23, at 930.
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national law. It's certainly historically inaccurate to take that
position.26 Many scholars have regarded the principles governing
choice of law as universal, often grounded in natural law precepts; and
today some treaties specify choice-of-law principles.27 In short,
choice-of-law law may derive from international sources.
If we look at choice of law from a practice perspective, we also
see it as "international" or "transnational." International lawyers, who
work with cases and transactions involving people or events in more
than one country, regularly grapple with choice-of-law and other conflicts issues. I once had a student who took five courses from me. I
asked, during the last course, "don't you get tired of hearing the same
thing?" I meant that each of us-each faculty member-has his or her
own views about the nature of law and the legal process. Each of us
communicates those core views in different courses. But with Conflicts and International Litigation, two of the courses I've taught,
there's really a significant overlap. I took over International Litigation
from Chin Kim when he retired. He had called the course Private International Law. It addresses the same core issues as Conflict of Laws.
Justice Traynor was at the center of the U.S. "conflicts revolution.",28 This revolution rejected a widely accepted territorial approach
to choice of law. That approach led courts to apply one or another
state's law based solely on one particular territorial contact, without
concern for the content of the law. Traynor instead favored, as a judge
and later as a scholar, a version of interest analysis to solve choice-oflaw problems. 29 Under interest analysis, to be a bit simplistic, a court
26.

See Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 INT'L &

COMP. L.Q. 1 (2006).
27. Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents, May 4,
1971, 965 U.N.T.S. 416; Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products
Liability, Oct. 2, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 192.
28. Modern conflict of laws textbooks still excerpt many of Justice Traynor's
opinions. See, e.g., PETER HAY, RUSSELL J. WINTRAUB & PATRICK J. BORCHERS,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 301-03, 479-81, 564-66, 595-98 (12th ed. 2004) (excerpting
Worthley v. Worthley, 283 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1955), Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944
(Cal. 1953), Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961), and Reich v. Purcell,
432 P.2d 727 (Cal. 1967)).
29.

See Roger J. Traynor, War and Peace in the Conflict of Laws, 25 INT'L &

COMP. L.Q. 121 (1976) [hereinafter Traynor, War and Peace]. Justice Traynor did
not arrive at interest analysis all at once. In one of his early choice-of-law opinions,
he used the language of the traditional territorial approach but characterized the
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tries to ascertain the policies related to the potentially applicable laws
of different states. It then determines whether those policies actually
apply to the parties in the multistate context at issue. If a state has no
significant policies at stake, its territorial connection to an accident or
transaction should not, by itself, lead the court to apply that state's
law. In essence, Traynor followed the same judicial methodology in
conflicts cases that he followed in other cases. He was willing to
reshape or abandon wooden precedent. He reasoned carefully. He
applied state policies that helped state citizens when the facts of a case
brought those policies into play. We see these features in Traynor's
conflicts opinions as well as in his other opinions.
I know I've claimed that we may regard conflict of laws as a type
of international law, but I doubt that Justice Traynor did. He was not
what I would call an "internationalist." He was a state supreme court
justice, immersed in California law and policy. Had he identified the
source of the choice-of-law law that California courts applied in conflicts cases, I suspect he would have called it California common law
rather than universal international law. Furthermore, Justice Traynor's
approach to choice of law had a forum law bias. He deferred to
California statutes or judicial precedents when he found-not always
an easy determination-that they applied to interstate or international
situations. 30 Where he didn't find a controlling statute or precedent
that applied to multijurisdictional situations, and where California and
another jurisdiction both had applicable policies, he would generally
choose California law. 3 1 Justice Traynor, in his conflicts opinions as in
issue, in a negligence case involving a survival action, as "procedural." This
characterization led Justice Traynor to apply forum (California) law. His opinion

made clear that California policies were applicable, and that using the law of the
place of the accident (Arizona) to deny recovery in a case involving a California
victim and a California tortfeasor (the decedent) would have been unjust. Traynor
later noted that Grant was "developed .

.

. against the brooding background of a

petrified forest," but that it helped clear the path towards California's rejection of the
traditional approach and adoption of interest analysis. Roger J. Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REv. 657, 670 n.35 (1959)
30. Traynor, War and Peace, supra note 29, at 130-34.
31. See id. at 148-54. Justice Traynor's use of interest analysis was nuanced,
and he exercised discretion when he evaluated applicable policies in light of the
facts of cases. For example, in Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961), a
case concerning an oral contract made in Nevada that a California plaintiff sought to
enforce against the estate of a decedent who had died domiciled in California,
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his other opinions, sought to further the needs of California society.
Justice Traynor recognized that change was a legal constant. The
law did and should change, to "meet new conditions and new," in his
view, "moral values." 32 Would a judge who today followed Justice
Traynor's approach to judging be more of an internationalist? That
question doesn't have a quick or easy answer, and the answer
probably would be different for different issue areas. The question is
really part of a broader one: how can, and when should, international
law be brought into the U.S. legal system? That's one of the questions
that occupies those of us who see in international legal developments
promising ways to address some truly pressing international and
national problems. Justice Traynor sought to use the law to address
current social needs, though he also, I believe, recognized that we will
never have a cavernous gap between generally accepted societal
values and legal developments. I imagine-and here I hope I'm not
simply projecting my own international outlook-that Roger Traynor,
were he with us today, would have contributed vitally to our
consideration of how international law intersects with the U.S. legal
system in the changed circumstances of the twenty-first century.
Let me close by again thanking the Dean, the Trustees, and the
Traynor family for this honor. I also particularly want to acknowledge
the help I have received over the years from Associate Dean William
Aceves, from some excellent research and teaching assistants, and
from our outstanding librarians. I also greatly appreciate the support
of our various administrative professionals, including Sandy Moreau,
Diane Shragg, Joyce Stallworth, and Diane Sopko. We all know these
are the folks who really run California Western and make it possible
for the faculty to teach, write, and engage in professional service. I
thank my colleagues, who continue to teach me a lot. Finally, I thank
my family, for their tremendous patience and for teaching me that I
really cannot do anything just by myself.
Justice Traynor compared a substantial Nevada interest in upholding the contract
with the policy behind California's statute of frauds. Instead of simply applying that
California policy and refusing to enforce the contract, however, Traynor also noted
California's general policy of protecting the reasonable expectations of contracting
parties. He upheld the contract, thus giving effect to the "common policy of both
states." Id. at 910.
32. Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956
U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232 (1956).

